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Garland (1990: 4) has written that “modern punishment… is a realm for the expression of social value and emotion as well as a process for asserting control”. To what extent are these justifications held in balance today? According to some commentators, the principles and values on which punishment is founded have disintegrated over recent years leaving control paramount. No longer concerned with restraint or moral efficacy, a surge in punitive emotion has divided society along class and racial lines. Disproportionately directed at poor and minority ethnic groups (Simon, 2001; Wacquant, 2009), public enthusiasm for harsher forms of punishment has increased in intensity and volatility to become ‘vindictive’, ‘vituperative’, ‘hostile’ (Young, 2003). The result: moral ambivalence about the right and wrong way to respond to criminals has been distilled into ‘common sense’ penal policies enacted simply to pander to an increasingly punitive mood (Bottoms, 1995). Since the beginning of the 1990s in the USA and UK especially, a rapid escalation in mass imprisonment has been driven by a political culture of ‘reckless excess’ (Loader, 2010: 350). 

On a broader scale over the same period, there has been renewed interest in the role of human feeling in public and political life. Somewhat paradoxically, a hallmark of the criminological literature informed by this so called ‘affective turn’ in the social sciences is that normative understandings of emotion as being incongruous to the proper and fair administration of criminal justice have been questioned (Posner, 1999; Karstedt, 2002). In that it has opened up a space for competing perspectives facilitating new understandings of criminal behaviour and social censure the return of emotion to academic criminological discourse is considered timely. It has flagged up the particularity of debate which considers the motivations of offenders simply in terms of rational choice, and following Hume (1969 [1769/70]) and Durkheim (1973 [1914]) reminded us that emotions are intrinsic to moral reasoning and the symbolic character of punishment (De Haan and Loader, 2002). The challenge is to render emotional responses to crime and sensitivity to human relations compatible: to acknowledge the legitimacy of the punitive passions while exercising control over them. Arguing that hostile and stigmatising forms of punishment hinder the reintegration of offenders into the community and increase risks of re-offending, Sherman (2003: 25-26) has proposed a new system of ‘emotionally intelligent justice’ founded on legal procedures which respond to the ‘reasonable emotional needs’ of “suspected, accused, and convicted offenders, as well as… victims, their families and communities”. More precisely, the intention is to avoid emotions of anger, humiliation, fear and disgust and engage emotions of remorse, guilt, shame, empathy and hope (ibid: 11).

 The concept of ‘emotional intelligence’ has a wide provenance. It emerged during the 1970s and 80s from psychometric research (see Salovey and Mayer, 1990) and has since been applied to certain social systems, for example schools (Elias et al., 2001), the work place (Caruso and Wolfe, 2001) and social work practice (Howe, 2008). Defined as the ability to understand and manage emotional information and make better informed judgements and decisions, emotional intelligence has also been linked to an array of non-cognitive characteristics such as well-being, motivation and inter-personal relationships in domestic and public life (Goleman, 1996).

Fusing the dichotomies of emotion and reason, feeling and the intellect is a long standing philosophical problem. Inconsistency in the ways emotions are experienced and viewed in personal, social and cultural life means the relationship between emotion and intelligence has an uncertain epistemological status. In stating that “emotional impulses… overwhelm rational cognition”, Sherman (2003: 6) locates the relationship psychologically within the brain of the individual. Accordingly, mental training is required to manage emotions, recognise emotions in victims and offenders, and reach a better understanding of the criminal justice system’s emotions. Who is to receive this training? Be it wholesale or piecemeal, the realignment of criminal justice systems is dependent on the engagement of officials: judges, magistrates, the police, prison and probation officers.  Emotionally intelligent justice will emerge from “a cycle of theory, innovations, and research” (ibid: 6) through which present ‘expressive’ (retributivist) and ‘economic’ (utilitarian) paradigms of justice will be transformed by state efforts “to make its officials control their own emotions” (ibid: 8). Referring to comprehensive changes in criminal justice brought about by a small group of intellectuals during the Enlightenment through the evaluation of new institutional designs and the power of moral argument, an explicit connection is made between the alternative paradigm of restorative justice and the nurturing of constructive emotions and better human relationships between officials, offenders and victims, and within the wider community. 

Rather than impugning the conceptual validity of emotionally intelligent justice, its general ‘goodness’ or ‘rightness’, this article subjects it to theoretical scrutiny. It also highlights key difficulties the strategy proposed for its advancement must overcome. A key area of concern is the proposal to isolate the solution to the problem of overly hostile punishment within criminal justice settings. Such a view ignores the tendency for punitive judgement to be shaped in the real world, within different cultural settings and historical traditions according to the everyday needs, concerns and struggles of people. Assuming it is possible to institutionalise emotion and manage it in situ, emotionally intelligent justice ignores normative, structural constraints, cultural forces, and wider social and political relations of power. Emotionally intelligent justice is grounded in both moral emotion (emotions that respond to moral violations) and conscious and deliberative reasoning. The article explores the strength of emotions linked to crime and justice: their meaning, and the authenticity and legitimacy accorded to traditional forms of punishment within everyday life. More than this, it argues that regulating emotions of sympathy, empathy and compassion over anger, shame and disgust involves coming to terms with issues of class, race, gender, sexuality and religion. It also entails reaching appropriate and adequate responses to a range of pressing social problems: economic uncertainty, social deprivation and mental depression for example. People generally must be persuaded of the value of emotionally intelligent justice and the principle and practice of restorative justice on which it is based. Advancing emotionally intelligent justice requires us not only to change institutional views of crime and punishment but also how such matters are represented socially and politically.   
 
The permanence of moral emotion

A feature of the affective turn in the social sciences has been the exercise of rationality combined with the expression of emotion in organisations. The institutional focus of emotionally intelligent justice is in keeping with the notion of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 1983). An obvious difference however between the interplay of rationality and emotion in standard areas of work and criminal justice settings is the nature of the emotion experienced. Emotion in service occupations, for example, may be mandated and managed in order to appeal to the customer. But emotion experienced and expressed in criminal justice settings is not so easily standardised. The distinction is between emotions which are essentially neutral and therefore subject to economic orientation and those which, because they are deeply rooted in the moral concerns of people, are more resistant to change. To understand emotional dynamics in criminal justice settings it is useful to consider the power and permanence of basic emotions which have fundamentally moral origins.

On the premise that a complexity of emotions overlap, merge and recur within everyday life, it has been proposed that ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions (Ekman, 1994) mix and match to form different types or compounds (Plutschik, 2002). Two different schools of thought contextualise this theoretical approach. Emotion is either shaped by changing patterns of socialisation, social interaction and cultural lifestyle or, alternatively, emotions are universal, somatic and discreet. Emotion is culturally constructed and hence subject to conscious evaluation and revision (Soloman, 2007; Fridja, 1986) or it is biologically primitive and evolves naturally as a basic means of survival (Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 2002). Uniting these paradigms is central to understandings of moral judgement, long considered to be either conscious and intentional or intuitive and involuntary. 

Moral reasoning and ethical judgement are contentious concepts involving abstract, general and impersonal principles of fairness and justness (Turiel et al., 1987). As such, the extent to which forces underlying punitive emotion are subject to historical and geographical variation (Tonry and Frase, 2001) or constant and universal (Zimring et al., 2001) remains open to dispute. On the one hand, moral judgement is politically constituted by common knowledge and shared meaning, and centred on the fluctuating interests of society as a whole (Hoggett and Thompson 2012). Changing definitions and status accorded to deviant behaviours such as homosexuality and drug taking as well as public and institutional variances in criminal justice response fixed in relation to them, is evidence of the social construction and relativity of moral meaning (Musolf, 2003: 279). On the other hand, moral judgement is not subject to re-evaluation, re-appraisal and re-education. It arrives unconsciously, instantaneously and automatically (Haidt, 2001; 2003). Evidence for this is the inability of people to articulate a rational basis for the moral convictions they hold. Hidden from conscious understanding, often people are ‘morally dumbfounded’ when asked to justify their most deeply held moral attitudes and beliefs (Bjorklund et al., 2000). 

On the basis that negative emotions degrade reasoning processes, emotionally intelligent justice seeks to transform aggressive, stigmatising emotions such as anger and revenge into supportive emotions such as empathy and sympathy for people who cause us harm (Sherman and Strang, 2011). The problem to overcome is the centrality to human nature of both positive and negative emotion. Actions which violate generally understood principles of fairness and justice may be responded to with compassion and concern but equally they are likely to elicit feelings of punitiveness and revenge. To investigate whether such basic emotion is innate and ubiquitous across cultures, Ekman (1992) has ordered emotion into ‘emotion families’, and Haidt (2003) has refined the typology further by comparing families of negative, ‘condemning’ moral emotions (indignation, disgust, anger and contempt) with positive, ‘suffering’ emotions (empathy and compassion). Both suffering and condemning emotions shape social order. Being moved to ‘do good’ for others from feelings of compassion and sympathy is an intuitive moral sentiment (Hume, 1969 [1769/70]; Smith, 2010 [1790]) common to the animal world not only humans (De Waal, 2009). But the action tendencies motivated by negative emotion: “ostracism, shaming and murderous vengeance are no less a part of our moral nature” (Haidt, 2003: 4). The exclusivity of positive and negative emotions cannot be assumed. As Nussbaum (2001: 396-7) has written, “these dark forces cannot be cut off from the rest of human life without impoverishing it… compassion and revenge do go hand in hand”. 

The relative strength of negative and positive emotion is the issue. History suggests negative moral emotions are more powerful than positive ones. Envy, ressentiment between the powerful and powerless, advantaged and disadvantaged is at base the affective origin of moral judgement (Nietzsche, 1994 [1887]). And firmly held authoritarian attitudes are “an expression of deep-lying trends in personality” (Adorno et al., 1950: 1). The prolonged public criticism of sentencing for its perceived leniency over any proper consideration of the justifications on which such decisions are made (Cullen et al., 2000) indicates the persistence of collective rage and anger in human ethical affairs. Similarly, the consistent line of association drawn between crime and marginal populations which throughout history has resulted in the disproportionate imprisonment of the poor and lower classes (Reiman, 2004) reveals an affective orientation towards domination, prejudice and discrimination. Given the prominence of condemning lines of force in moral affairs and social relations the challenge facing emotionally intelligent justice is a considerable one.  Negative emotions underpinning traditional forms of punishment are more likely to define moral judgement than positive ones associated with abstract categories of justice based on the resolution of conflict or the restoration of community relations (Jasper, 1998: 414). As Sparks (2000) has observed, an intuitive concern for the suffering of others is often the precursor to repressive forms of treatment directed at those perceived to have caused it; a feature of public life exacerbated today by ‘mass media narratives of brutal victimisation’ (ibid, 2011: 319). In order to understand more about the ways negative emotion might be managed in systems of emotionally intelligent justice, it is necessary to understand the dynamics by which emotion and intelligence are linked. The next section considers the other side of the equation: intelligence, but not as counterbalance to punitive emotion, rather as reinforcement.

The automaticity of moral judgement

Emotionally intelligent justice focuses attention on emotion and also interior psychological and mental states. Layder (2004: 12) has written that “the emotional or feeling side of our nature goes hand in hand with our reflective, intelligent and calculating side”. It is a two way process. Emotion activates belief and beliefs activate emotion (Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1995; Scherer et al., 2000). Beliefs influenced by emotion tend to be strong beliefs (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). The automaticity of the emotional response is rigid enough normally to cancel out key components of cognition: reasoning, evaluation, and judgement. On the other hand, beliefs which precede and guide emotional response are more likely to persist owing to the relative strength of the values linked to them (Goldberg et al., 1999). These observations hold for both individuals and groups. Eagly and Chaiken (1998) define values as attitudes expressed towards abstract entities such as rules of conduct. As such, they have a moral and ethical dimension which informs norms and expectations about how the social world should be. The ability to control emotion with belief improves understanding of others and the capacity to act wisely and responsibly in public life (Goleman, 1996). Ultimately, emotionally intelligent justice will stand or fall depending on whether human beings are conducive to value appeals which accord greater worth to positive emotions than negative ones. 

Social psychological analysis of the origins of group attitudes including attribution, stereotyping and scapegoating provides pointers to how emotion and intelligence together influences moral judgement and just as importantly why it does. A key area of deliberation is the relationship between socio-cultural context and the subjective experience of that context. Research has assessed the interior and private means by which personal and social identities are shaped according to positions adopted in relation to pressing social issues such as poverty, inequality, crime and punishment. Attention has focused primarily on the mental processes by which groups form and change attitudes and construct stereotypes including how strongly they are adhered to and the ‘truth’, ‘commonality’ or ‘universality’ of the individual and shared beliefs and judgements which underpin them. This work suggests that stereotypes serve to simplify complex social phenomena and maintain and distinguish collective values and ideologies (Tajfel, 1981). In assigning causes to effects, ‘attribution’ or ‘motive imputation’ renders the social world predictable. Because time and information is limited and we often lack the motivation to reach considered positions on complex social problems, there is an inclination to rely on individual experience and emotional cues (Aronson, 1991). Attitudes formed and received heuristically without systematic or evaluative effort (Bohner et al., 1995) engender readymade, partial and arbitrary understandings of the world.  Group attitudes are also limited by age, gender, social class, geographical location and religion. Nevertheless, they enable information to be processed quickly, automatically, comfortably and with a degree of conviction and certitude (Katz, 1960). Moreover, they retain a force of reason by dint of being assumptions and inferences about what makes sense in the world that are immediate and personal to us. 

Social psychological perspectives suggest there is a utility to the mental processes underpinning moral judgement. Beliefs about crime, punishment and rules of conduct are implicit, deliberate and automatic. Punitiveness stems from a connection purposefully made between personal experience and inter-group comparison. In that they facilitate the expression of individual and group values (Katz, 1960) punitive attitudes are useful and advantageous. For instance, people demonstrate a propensity to make ‘correspondence biases’ (Gilbert, 1995) privileging dispositional causes to the behaviour of others over circumstantial factors, but reverse the process when assessing their own behaviour. Anger is elicited and punishment demanded especially when people infer that criminal actions are associated with internal, stable and controllable causes (Lerner et al., 1998). Psycho-analytical research provides two basic reasons for this. First, people assume a sense of superiority over those whose actions they link to personal traits (Miller et al., 1978) and second, individual or group behaviour is typically more distinctive than the situation or context in which it occurs (Rholes and Pryor, 1982). 

This is not the whole story of course. It would be terse and simplistic to suggest cognitive predispositions emphasising the inadequacy of others alone determine moral judgements. Unless an individual is psychopathic, moral compunctions are never summarily dismissed by mental processes for which individuals hold no responsibility. Although variable and inconsistent, a degree of emotional intelligence is always present in perceptions of value, ethical reasoning and the moral judgements we hold towards others (Nussbaum, 2001) Still, the components of emotional intelligence are highly complex and duo direct. Wider social, economic and cultural transformations (structure) interact with individual attitudes and our relationships and dealings with others (agency). For emotionally intelligent justice to advance therefore understanding is required of the human propensity to stigmatise social groups on the basis of deficiency and demand increasingly punitive sanctions are deployed against them. It must confront the tendency of people to ascribe character traits of dependency, fecklessness and hedonism to economically marginalised groups and ignore or discount structural factors such as poverty and unemployment. Before addressing the question of how emotional intelligent justice might counter punitive emotions and attitudes, it is necessary to review the contemporary social and cultural contexts in which inter-group prejudice forms and moral judgements are located.
 
The ‘affective state’ of public punitiveness

Emotionally intelligent justice has been hailed as a compelling and persuasive response to what is generally considered an increasingly emotionalised and punitive public discourse on crime and justice (Karstedt, 2011). What is the correct way to read the ‘punitive turn’ thought to have taken place in contemporary public life? It is common to point up the expressive function that punitive public attitudes serve within advanced capitalist society (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997). Ignoring the doxa that links punitiveness to a rise in rates of crime or victimisation, ‘popular punitiveness’ is understood in relation to changes in the structure of society as a whole: its social relations, culture and institutions. Grounded in broad sociological analyses of globalisation (Giddens, 1991) and ‘risk’ (Beck, 1992), punitiveness is considered a response to a ubiquitous new ‘state of being’ made manifest in various forms and contexts. These include the following: ‘social anxiety’, driven by a distancing of social relations and a weakening of functional dependencies (Garland, 2001); ‘economic uncertainty’, a consequence of market deregulation and lack of job security (Bauman, 2000); and ‘fears over personal and public safety’, generated by interventionist government agendas which prioritise strict law and order policies (Simon, 2007), complemented by a mass mediated narrative which exaggerates the incidence of crime and risk of victimisation (Jewkes, 2011). The result is ‘ontological insecurity’, a somewhat abstract concept of the self denoting a mass crisis of personal and social identity. First coined by Laing (1973) to explain serious mental disorders such as schizophrenia and psychosis, ontological insecurity has since been re-defined to include both individual and collective experience (Giddens, 1991). Crisis of identity is believed to be endemic. Psychological tension and emotional, moral disquiet are disabling and enduring (ibid: 184/5). Popular punitiveness stems from inter-group conflict and defensive aggression relied upon to assuage feelings of anxiety, uncertainty and frustration. Through the hardening of social identities and the shoring up of group affiliations, most readily achieved by ‘scapegoating’ and ‘negative stereotyping’, “the core, unchanging nature of oneself and others” is reasserted (Young, 2003: 389). Instead of directing anger and aggression at the real source of the problem – global capitalism, joblessness, the loss of communal solidarity – it is displaced onto marginalised and excluded groups prejudiced for threatening the social and economic order (Young, 1999; Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009). 

In key respects this socio-cultural constructionist schema resonates with the moral emotional and social psychological perspectives considered in the previous sections. The important difference being that popular punitiveness is not an interior phenomenon. Rather than being deeply felt or automatically received, it is subject to external economic forces and shifts in cultural symbols and ideals. All told, “meanings within and without the penal system influence the quantity and quality of punishment” (Smith, 2008: 6). As a social construction, popular punitiveness is unstable, unpredictable, ill-defined and amenable to change. Intense and powerful as they might be, popular punitive emotions are alternating and not uniformly coercive across society as a whole. Immediately, this presents an opportunity for emotionally intelligent justice to advance. Punitiveness is incoherent and the public is not nearly as demanding of punishment as is sometimes assumed (Roberts and Hough, 2002). Indeed, it is open to persuasion. Punitive emotion is ambivalent and the social order of punishment it serves to reproduce can be altered. To assess the validity of this perspective it is worth considering the forms and types of punitive emotion in public life a little further.

A rich tradition of philosophical, social and cultural theory has demonstrated the centrality of emotion to social life, in particular collective feelings of ‘estrangement’, ‘anxiety’, ‘separation’ and ‘isolation’ engendered by materialistic conditions of capitalism. Although very different in conception and epistemological span, ‘dread’ (Kierkegaard, (1957 [1844]), ‘alienation’ (Marx, 1956 [1844]), ‘anomie’ (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]), a ‘blasé’ attitude (Simmel, 1971 [1903]), ‘destructiveness’ (Fromm, 1984 [1942]), ‘one-dimensionality’ (Marcuse, 2002 [1964]), ‘boredom’ (Lefebvre, 1995 [1962])  and ‘depthlessness’ (Jameson, 1991) are all terms intended to encapsulate the unsettling effects of (post)modernity on psycho-emotional life. From this classic tradition of philosophical and social scientific analysis, contemporary emotion research has drawn a distinction between individual or ‘reactive’ emotions and group emotions or ‘affective states’ (Jasper, 1998; Kemper, 2002). Whereas reactive emotion is temporary and consciously directed towards an external object or event, an affective state is widespread and indeterminate thereby making it difficult to establish structural regularity to the emotional activity it comprises. The direction in which collective emotion suffuses social relations and elicits collective responses is always prone to fluctuation and change (Scherer et al., 2004). 

Popular punitiveness is understood to be a product of social and economic transformation. As such, it may be considered an affective state beset by social, cultural and historical imprecision. The epistemological uncertainty raises a number of questions about the prevalence of punitive emotion within contemporary society. Is ontological insecurity a conceivable, coherent state of being? If so, over what time frame did it manifest itself as such? Has there ever been a time when society was ontologically secure? Is ontological security even possible? How is punitiveness generated as a shared, collective behaviour? For example, is it contagious, ‘electrically’ transmitted as ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim, 1995 [1912])? Is it mutually reinforced through inter-comparison, ‘mind reading’ and ‘perspective taking’ (Goldman, 1993)? Or is it diffused impulsively in crowd situations (Diener, 1980)? There are a myriad explanations and a morass of doubt.

Criminology has long wrestled with questions of how individuals do, or do not conform, to social types (see Gadd and Jefferson, 2007). Societal reaction is never homogenous and emotional responses fluctuate and change (Kemper, 2002). Emotions linked to moral judgements and punishment contend for dominance, vary in intensity and may be actively resisted according to social and demographic variables of class, age, race, or local context (Jasper, 1998). Difficult to track and pin down, ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ are especially disparate emotions. Anxiety may be repressed, reduced and rise and fall as “its object constantly shifts from one thing to another, almost as if the object is secondary to the feeling” (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012: 3). It may be expressed as contempt and aggressiveness towards particular social groups and punitiveness may be resorted to as a key coping response. But equally, anxiety may instil world weariness, compliance, even paralysis.  Moreover, feelings of anxiety and insecurity overlap and vary in frequency and intensity (Gray et al., 2008). Fear, for example, is commonly confused with ‘worry’, ‘insecurity’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘unease’ (Hale, 1996: 84). An understandable response to uncertainty and risk, it is commonly assumed that fear of crime has risen in contemporary life and this, in turn, has increased public demands for more severe punishments. Yet research shows the opposite to be true. Fear of crime is infrequent (Farrall and Gadd, 2004), and “serious fear situations are few and far between in the normal course of events” (Scherer et al., 2004: 520). 
 
Research on everyday emotions linked to crime suggests the public is not necessarily excessively punitive and may be willing to contemplate other forms of justice including restorative justice. Emotions such as anxiety and fear exhibit varying degrees of prominence and reflexivity within contemporary society. They also provoke different reactions. While they are likely to increase demands for exclusionary mechanisms of control to be used against stereotyped groups, they might also underpin appeals for peace, restoration and rehabilitation. A major complication however is that the complex psycho-social dynamics of everyday emotional existence make it difficult to gauge public responses to crime and punishment. The range of emotions linked to punitiveness is not as simply categorised as the literature on emotionally intelligent justice suggests. For change to occur a different set of cultural symbols and ideas linked to punishment needs to take root. This is liable to occur unintentionally. As Smith (2008: 1) has argued, punishment is “always the locus of intense narrative activity and contestation within a wider civil discourse”. Another complication is that public interest in punishment is not only stirred by cultural change, it is also subject to control. Governments, the media and other moral entrepreneurs seek to manipulate punitive emotions in order to secure their interests and reproduce the social order (Nussbaum, 1996). Rather than attempt to manage emotion through mechanisms of penal moderation and restorative dialogue, the state is more inclined to direct it in ways which supports the status quo. Thus, everyday meanings and values linked to crime and justice are reaffirmed to shore up traditional criminal justice practices. The influence on criminal justice systems of wider power relations has been acknowledged by advocates of emotionally intelligent justice. But it is one thing to argue that “we live in a world where if justice is to be an accomplishment of our civilization, it will be more an accomplishment of civil society than the state” (Braithwaite (2006: 407). The question remains how this will be accomplished in practice. 

The advancement of emotionally intelligent justice: policy making implications

Sherman (2003) proposes that advocates of emotionally intelligent justice - penal reformers and academic criminologists - should aim to nurture the insights and capabilities of leaders and officials who deliver justice on behalf of the state. In the pejorative sense of the word, this is elitist. As Loader (2006: 582) has argued, “the idea that crime should be kept out of public life, safely handled by a coterie of experts, was and remains profoundly anti-democratic”. After all, it is in the public interest that punishment, in whatever form it takes, is inflicted. Moreover, it suggests a subset of highly professional people can be trained to demonstrate emotional intelligence regarding crime and punishment above and beyond the means of ordinary people. The strategy begs a number of rhetorical questions. What qualities are required for the role?  Does the capacity to manage negative emotions and communicate positive ones differ according to gender, class or race? Are there particular life experiences and motivations which might help criminal justice officials better understand the social circumstances of people brought before them in courts of law? Or are there presently economic, social, and cultural characteristics common to the hierarchical status of criminal justice officials which separate them off from the everyday concerns of ordinary people? Studies in the UK reveal in fact that the present incumbents embody a predominant and to a significant extent sovereign habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Far from representative of the communities they serve, magistrates are mostly middle class, conservative and white, while judges are mostly middle to upper-class, privately educated, male and white (Cavadino et al., 2013: 88-89). Moreover, both are prone to disdain initiatives which seek to limit their judicial discretion including, no doubt, training in emotional competency. Magistrates and judges receive little training and are generally dismissive of it. Therefore, judicial decision making is rendered “impervious to criticism from outside and highly resistant to attempts at external control” (ibid: 88).

Criminal justice systems and the law and order ideologies on which they are founded are not isolated worlds of their own. They are a product of institutional (MacCormick, 2007), economic (Lacey, 2008) and cultural forces (Smith, 2008). Crime and punishment is responded to instinctively, including by criminal justice officials, through everyday experience. As a matter of course, harms, pains and conflicts caused by crime are internalised incidentally through ‘social learning’ (Vygotsky, 1978). Attempts to advance emotionally intelligent justice must address the implications of this. As Nussbaum (2001: 402) has argued, the embodiment within institutions of any political conception of value and ethical reasoning “needs to concern itself with citizens’ motivations, both in order to be feasible in the first place – does not impose impossible strains on human psychology – and also in order to ensure that it has a decent chance of being stable over time”. 

Arguments in favour of emotionally intelligent justice remain at the margins of political policy making. Articulating and promoting the value of emotion management in criminal justice settings and more broadly in public life is a difficult proposition, particularly for academic criminology, a discipline founded on rationality, empiricism and reason (Karstedt, 2011). A method proposed is to demonstrate the value of restorative justice through direct engagement and participant observation. Durkheim (1984 [1893]) famously argued it is only through direct exposure to the rituals of punishment that the value of wider human affairs - morality, reason, social order, civilisation, justice and fairness - may be understood. At a discrete case level, the usefulness of witnessing in person the outcomes of punishment is supported by academic research. Being held accountable and asked to justify punitive responses encourages people to become “flexible, balanced thinkers”, thereby activating “more complex and systematic forms of information processing” (Lerner et al., 1998: 564). When asked to judge the merits of individual cases, particularly in relation to whether justice has been served or not, people are prepared to consider issues of intentionality and mitigation, and as a consequence temper emotional outrage and attributions of blame (Goldberg et al., 1999).  Furthermore, although research on the effectiveness of restorative justice initiatives is conflicting (see Levrant et al., 1999; Braithwaite, 1999), some evaluations of mediation settings have found that victims of crime are more inclined to express suffering emotions of compassion and forgiveness when offenders express remorse and apologise for the harm caused to them (Strang, 2002). 

These results are encouraging. They demonstrate participants and observers in restorative justice settings are prepared to make emotional and cognitive shifts in moral judgement which do privilege the expression of positive over negative emotions. Yet they are incomplete. Not only are such experimental exercises few in number, they are conducted in specially convened settings in which people are observed acting differently to the way they would in ‘real life’. As argued throughout this article, within civil society generally, emotional ‘moods’ or affective states provide experiences and information for moral judgements which entail no such conscious evaluation or reasoning (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Distanced from the rituals of punishment, the pain and suffering caused to offenders is all too easily neutralised, automatically reduced to retributivist retaliation and/or a simple utilitarian calculus based on deterrence and notions of the greater good. 

To advance, emotionally intelligent justice needs to move beyond the parameters of experimental research into society as a whole. As others have argued, more and more public moods are integral to public narrative and political discourse (Jasper, 1998; Hoggett and Thompson, 2012). In matters of criminal justice, pluralist public perceptions and preferences must be attended to (Ryan, 2003; Loader, 2006).  Abstract reconsiderations of justice based on reconciliation and restoration are impacted upon by institutional and administrative structures which serve the interests of a range of opinion formers: politicians, lobbyists, pressure groups and the media (Garland and Sparks, 2000). Such interests are likely to have deep moral emotional roots that remain resistant to policy prescriptions based on the findings of criminological research (Tittle, 2004). More than this, even if public officials are persuaded as to the merits of restorative justice practices, the state “is no longer pre-eminent in public policy” (Osborne, 2010: 6). Public opinion is an important barometer of the prospects for political and social reform, and political frameworks reproduce themselves through the deliberate manufacture of public consent (Kingdon, 1995). Either way, political change plays out today in an irrational, intimate, even fantastical public context (Duncombe, 2007). Social scientific research has been downgraded. Expert knowledge is considered suspect. Enlightenment era faith in research and the power of moral argument has disappeared. It is no longer sufficient to focus attention on the principles and practice of criminal justice institutions. If emotionally intelligent justice is to advance it must do so in a policy environment characterised by multiple and overlapping political, public and personal spheres of existence (Smith, 2001).     

Despite repeated affirmation of “the value and role of a public philosophy of punishment” (Loader, 2010: 349, emphasis in the original), the mechanisms by which emotionally intelligent justice might be communicated to a public audience are poorly understood. Based on the assumption that understandings of crime and punishment are limited and taken for granted in public life, one strategy has been to identify gaps and distortions in public knowledge and make good the deficit through the provision of clear, reliable and independent information (Roberts and Hough, 2002; 2005). The problem with this is that it does not address the affective dimensions of public attitudes. Given that emotion and low effort mental processes together shape punitive moral judgements, what people are prepared to accept as true about crime and punishment is likely to carry more weight than the messy complicated truth itself. Information, if it is to be absorbed at all in a world increasingly overloaded with information, must be kept simple and direct (Castells, 2004). The low level and sporadic forms of public engagement trialled to date – focus groups, deliberative polls etc. (Roberts and Hough, 2002) - while they aim to explore the assumptions, judgements and attitudes which lie behind public punitiveness, are not designed to bring about the long term educational effects predicted to flow from them. 
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